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NOTES
A CALL TO ACTION—EXAMINING NEPAL’S
POST-CONFLICT STRATEGY TOWARD PERSONS
ACCUSED OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
Jennifer Chiang*
This Note analyzes Nepal’s attempts to establish accountability and the
rule of law in the aftermath of its ten-year civil war. It compares Nepal’s
treatment of persons implicated in gross human rights violations with the
international human rights legal framework surrounding a state’s
international obligations, particularly in its use of transitional justice
mechanisms. It argues that Nepal’s failure to bring either administrative
sanctions or criminal prosecutions against officials accused of human
rights abuses—and its reliance instead on truth commissions—undermines
the rule of law and violates the country’s international human rights
obligations.
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INTRODUCTION
Arjun Bahadur Lama was celebrating his election as president of the
local school in April 2005 when he was abducted by members of the Maoist
party from the village of Chhatrebanjh in Nepal.1 Witnesses say he was
paraded through villages by his captors and was not seen again.2 Several
witnesses informed Purni Maya Lama, Arjun Lama’s wife, that her husband
was brought before Agni Sapkota, a Central Committee Member of the
Maoist regime, who ordered Maoist soldiers to kill Arjun Lama and bury
his body.3 It was not until after many years and numerous attempts to start
an investigation, including an appeal to the Supreme Court of Nepal, that a
first incident report (FIR) was finally registered on August 11, 2008.4
Sapkota has never faced investigation or suspension from office; instead,
despite the allegations against him, he was promoted in May 2011 to
Minister for Information and Communications.5

1. Arjun Bahadur Lama, ADVOC. F.-NEPAL, http://www.advocacyforum.org/
emblematic-cases/2011/01/arjun-bahadur-lama.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Nepal Cabinet Reshuffle Draws UN Fire, TIMES INDIA (May 5, 2011, 7:45 PM),
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-05/south-asia/29512458_1_humanrights-maoists-people-s-war-information-and-communications-minister.

2012]

A CALL TO ACTION

941

In Nepal’s post-conflict society, there are numerous similar stories of
individuals being promoted to positions of public power and influence
despite accusations of grave human rights abuses.6 These stories serve as
examples of how Nepal has fallen short in its attempts to establish the rule
of law and meet its international obligations.
Under international law, Nepal is obligated to guarantee fundamental
human rights.7 This Note focuses on Nepal’s human rights obligations
regarding the treatment of persons who have had reports of human rights
abuses filed against them. Part I of this Note begins by providing a brief
history of Nepal and its conflict period. It then discusses the relevant
international standards and obligations regarding human rights and explores
various post-conflict mechanisms for dealing with persons implicated in
human rights abuses, as well as the Nepal’s existing transitional framework.
Part II compares these mechanisms with international obligations and
considers Nepal’s use of transitional justice mechanisms. Finally, Part III
argues that Nepal’s actions to date have not met international obligations,
and that Nepal must take affirmative steps to provide accountability for past
and continuing human rights violations. If Nepal is to move forward into
an era of political stability and democracy, it must strengthen the rule of
law by addressing past abuses while maintaining due process.
I. NEPAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
SURROUNDING ITS TRANSITION
The first part of this Note provides the international legal framework
underlying periods of transitional justice. Part I.A provides a brief history
of Nepal and the civil war from which the country is attempting to emerge.
Next, Part I.B establishes the link between transitional justice and the rule
of law. Then, Part I.C discusses Nepal’s human rights obligations during its
post-conflict transition. Finally, Part I.D provides an overview of various
transitional justice mechanisms.
A. History of Nepal’s Internal Conflict
Prior to any attempts at democracy, a hereditary monarchy governed
Nepal for 240 years.8 Even under the subsequent panchayat system, which
was portrayed as a representative government, the reality was that Nepal’s
government remained a one-party system ruled by the monarchy.9
6. See infra Part I.A for a brief history of Nepal’s civil war.
7. See infra Part I.C.1.
8. See Teresa Whitfield, Conflict Prevention & Peace Forum, Masala Peacemaking:
Nepal’s Peace Process and the Contribution of Outsiders, CENTER ON INT’L COOPERATION,
3 (October
2008),
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/staff/docs/whitfield/whitfield_masala_peace
making.pdf (“Nepal was ruled by a feudal and exclusionary monarchy for more than 200
years.”).
9. See Warisha Farasat & Priscilla Hayner, Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice,
Negotiating Peace in Nepal: Implications for Justice, INITIATIVE PEACEBUILDING, 10 (June
2009), http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Negotiating_Peace_in_Nepal.pdf; see
also Brad Adams, Nepal at the Precipice, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 121, 124 (“The
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Frustrated with the lack of real representation, the Nepali people started the
Jana Andolan I (First People’s Movement) in 1990.10 The movement
resulted in the overthrow of the old monarchy and the introduction of a
multiparty democratic system of governance under a new constitutional
monarchy.11 Despite this initial attempt at democracy, the resulting
government proved ineffective as political infighting and corruption
continued.12
Dissatisfied with the government, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists
(Maoists) released its “Forty-Point Demands” in February of 1996; among
them were the expulsion of foreign influences in Nepal and the
establishment of a secular democracy.13 After the government rejected
these demands, the Maoists embarked on a “people’s war” against the
government.14 As they fought, both the government and the Maoists
committed many human rights abuses including extrajudicial executions,
disappearances, abductions, and torture.15 The abuses increased in 2001
after King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and passed the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Ordinance (TADO), which declared the
Maoists to be terrorists and granted the security forces broad powers to
arrest those involved in terrorist activities.16 The King continued his efforts
to consolidate power, which over time fueled increasing dissatisfaction with
the government and urgency among the previously deadlocked political
parties, Maoists, and civil society to align against the King.17
panchayat system was touted as a representative system, but in reality the country was run by
a cluster of like-minded undemocratic politicians who obeyed the will of the king.”).
10. See Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 10; Whitfield, supra note 8, at 3 (describing
the end of the panchayat system of rule in Nepal in 1990 because of a pro-democracy
people’s movement).
11. See Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 10; see also Adams, supra note 9, at 124
(stating how King Binrendra “gave in to popular demands to lift the ban on political parties
and create a democratic state”).
12. See Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 10 (describing how the ensuing politicians
came to be seen as “opportunistic and corrupt”); see also Adams, supra note 9, at 125
(noting that the people’s movement was followed by thirteen increasingly unstable
governments overrun with political feuds and corruption).
13. See Whitfield, supra note 8, at 3 (“The start of the ‘people’s war’ waged by the
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) . . . against the Nepali state dates back to February 1996
when the government rejected a forty-point list of demands.”).
14. Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 10.
15. Id. at 10–11.
16. Advocacy Forum & Human Rights Watch, Waiting for Justice: Unpunished Crimes
from Nepal’s Armed Conflict, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 10 (Sept. 2008),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nepal0908web_0.pdf [hereinafter Waiting for
Justice] (noting that the majority of civilian deaths that occurred during the conflict period
occurred after the Royal Nepal Army was deployed); Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 10.
17. See Advocacy Forum & Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Across the Lines: The
Impact of Nepal’s Conflict on Women, OFF. HIGH COMM’R HUMAN RIGHTS, 22 (2010),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/AdvocacyForum_NepalCEDAW49.
pdf (discussing how the King’s attempt to take power in February 2005 consisted of
thousands of arbitrary arrests and detainments and hundreds of deaths, which drove political
parties and the Maoists to begin forming an alliance against the King); Farasat & Hayner,
supra note 9, at 13.
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Finally, in April 2006, an extraordinary Jana Andolan II (Second
People’s Movement) successfully forced the King to give up his power and
return it to the Parliament, thus restoring democracy.18 The People’s
Movement also marked an end to the ten-year civil war between the
Maoists and the government during which over 13,000 lives were claimed
and both sides of the conflict committed numerous human rights
violations.19 These abuses committed included disappearances20 and the
torture of detainees, among others.21
In November 2006, peace negotiations began in earnest between the
country’s major political parties and the Maoists.22 On November 21,
2006, Nepal’s government and the Maoists signed the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), which laid out the basic framework for the
country’s political transition.23 Less than a month later, Nepal adopted its
Interim Constitution.24 Under the Interim Constitution, the State is required
to adopt a political system that upholds fundamental human rights and to
eliminate corruption and impunity.25 The Constitution also references the
creation of a high-level Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), as
well as the Commission of Inquiry on Disappearances (Commission on
Disappearances) aligned with the directives of the CPA; both are intended
to address the abuses committed during the conflict.26
The signing of these documents signaled Nepal’s commitment to account
for past violations of human rights and to pave a path for peace and
democracy. Yet, Nepal still has not wholly emerged from conflict and
authoritarian rule, thus placing it in a transitional period.27
18. See Waiting for Justice, supra note 16, at 11 (stating that the King announced the
reinstatement of the House of Representatives on April 24, 2006).
19. No. of Victims Killed by State and Maoist in Connection with the “People’s War,”
INFORMAL SECTOR SERVICE CENTER, http://www.insec.org.np/pics/1247467500.pdf
[hereinafter INSEC] (calculating that a total of 13,347 deaths occurred during the conflict
period and reporting that the State was responsible for 8,377 deaths while the Maoists were
responsible for 4,970 deaths); Q&A: Nepal’s future, BBC NEWS (May 13, 2009, 10:46 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2707107.stm.
20. See Clear Culpability: “Disappearances” by Security Forces in Nepal, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, 24 (2005), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nepal0205.pdf;
Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 20 (noting the large number of disappearances).
21. See Nat’l Human Rights Comm’n, Human Rights in Nepal: A Status Report 2003,
ASIA FOUND., 35 (2003), http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/nepalhumanrights03.pdf.
22. See Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 14.
23. Id.
24. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL 2063 (2007), available at http://www.
lawcommission.gov.np/en/documents/prevailing-laws/constitution.html; see also Donna
Lyons, Maximising Justice: Using Transitional Justice Mechanisms to Address Questions of
Development in Nepal, 13 TRINITY C. L. REV. 111, 114 (2010); Farasat & Hayner, supra note
9, at 19–20.
25. Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Nepal-Communist Party Nepal (Maoist), ¶ 7.1,
Nov. 21, 2006 [hereinafter CPA], available at http://www.un.org.np/sites/default/files/
report/tid_188/2006-11-29-peace_accord-MOFA.pdf (unofficial translation).
26. See Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 20.
27. See Lyons, supra note 24, at 115 (pointing to the continued political unrest due to
the turnover within the government and the continued standstill over the reintegration of
Maoist rebels).
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B. Transitional Justice and the International Legal Framework
Transitional justice refers to a range of processes and mechanisms that a
society can implement to address its history of human rights violations in
order to lay a foundation for accountability, justice, and reconciliation.28
Integral to transitional justice is the establishment of the rule of law, a
principle of governance in which all persons are held equally accountable to
laws that are consistent with international human rights norms and
standards.29 For a society to move past a period of conflict and establish a
new legacy of peace and democracy, the people must see that the new
regime is making a good faith effort to apply justice to the past regime’s
legacy of human rights abuses.30
1. Linking the Rule of Law to Transitional Justice
Transitional justice and the rule of law represent two integrally connected
concepts in assessing and producing change during a society’s movement
away from a post-conflict regime. In any transition, a divide is created
between the old regime and the new regime, and it is within this divide that
the officials of the new regime must decide how to respond to calls for
justice.31
At the core of transitional justice lies the issue of how a state’s treatment
of its violent past and its associated human rights abuses will impact the
success of the state’s transition toward a democratic future.32 The notion
that a society cannot have closure until it addresses the problems of its past
has been noted in transitional justice scholarship.33 Thus, the principles of
transitional justice are often perceived as being focused on the past.34

28. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict
and Post-conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug.
23, 2004) (defining transitional justice as “the full range of processes and mechanisms
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”).
29. Id. ¶ 6 (defining the rule of law as “a principle of governance in which all persons,
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws
that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which
are consistent with international human rights norms and standards”).
30. Maryam Kamali, Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of
Transitional Justice in East Germany and South Africa, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 89, 92
(2001).
31. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117
HARV. L. REV. 762, 765–66 (2004).
32. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 6 (2000) (“As a state undergoes political
change, legacies of injustice have a bearing on what is deemed transformative.”).
33. See Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability
Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 127
(1996) (“The assumption that individuals or groups who have been the victims of hideous
atrocities will simply forget about them or expunge their feelings without some form of
accounting, some semblance of justice, is to leave in place the seeds of future conflict.”).
34. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 31, at 766 (describing how scholars often see
transitional justice as backward-looking in its goals). Justice is defined as “an ideal of
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Transitional justice mechanisms include, among other things, individual
prosecutions, truth-seeking, vetting, and dismissals, or some combination of
the above.35
The rule of law is an essential element of a democratic state and is
increasingly crucial during post-conflict reconstruction.36 One aspect of
establishing the rule of law is the reformation of state institutions.37
Standing for the ideal that every person is equally accountable to the laws
of the state regardless of their position within society, the rule of law
requires measures to ensure the supremacy of, and adherence to, the
nation’s laws by all people, including those working within state
institutions.38
Associating transitional justice with measures focused on the past has
often been used to condemn transitional justice mechanisms as preventing
the new regime from expending its valuable energies on forward-looking
measures that contribute to state building and economic growth.39 Yet, the
goals of transitional justice are essential for laying the foundation for the
rule of law and creating a society founded on sustainable peace and
democracy.40 By understanding the relationship between the backwardlooking goals of transitional justice and the forward-looking goals related to
building a new society, it becomes clear that, in any successful transitional
justice regime, addressing the past is a necessary step toward establishing
the rule of law as a strong foundation for the future.
A strong message of accountability is integral to the protection of human
rights.41 It provides a legal basis for citizens to challenge the government
accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and
punishment of wrongs.” U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 7.
35. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 8.
36. See David A. Crocker, Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework, in
ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A READER 45, 54 (Joel H. Rosenthal & Christian
Barry eds., 3d ed. 2009) (“Rule of law is especially important in a new and fragile
democracy bent on distinguishing itself from prior authoritarianism, institutionalized bias, or
the ‘rule of the gun.’”).
37. See id. at 56–57 (arguing that a sustainable transition requires the reformation of
basic institutions, including, among others, the judiciary, police, military, and structure of
economic opportunities).
38. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 6 (“[The rule of law] requires . . . measures
to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law,
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers,
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural
and legal transparency.”); Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the
Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 809, 827 (2005) (“[R]ule of law refers to a system in
which law is able to impose meaningful restraints on the state and individual members of the
ruling elite . . . .”).
39. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 31, at 801 (“The impulse is to look forward
rather than backward; opponents see retroactive justice, and transitional justice generally, as
a waste of institutional resources compared to the tasks of regime building.”).
40. See id. at 765 (“[R]etrospective measures themselves have important forwardlooking justifications . . . .”).
41. See Peerenboom, supra note 38, at 812 (“Without rule of law, rights remain lifeless
paper promises rather than the reality for many throughout the world.”).
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and thus protects the rights of the non-elite.42 Respect for the rule of law
will not only deter future human rights violations, it will also aid in the
development of a democratic state.43
On the other hand, ignoring the human rights abuses committed in the
past furthers the injuries of victims who have already been hurt by the
conflict.44 Victims may see the new society as one based on impunity,
which might lead to resentment, vigilante retribution, and further periods of
violent conflict.45 Thus, a new regime’s actions in addressing past human
rights abuses committed during a conflict period are integral to allowing the
rule of law and democracy to take root in a new society.46
2. Difficulties in the Transition Process
Due to the unique factors faced by each post-conflict country, there is no
single approach that can guarantee success in the path to reconstruction.47
Regardless of which method or combination of methods is pursued by a
new regime, efforts to establish the rule of law require, at a minimum, time,
money, and manpower.48 Yet, these are difficult to come by in war-torn
societies marked by devastated institutions, depleted resources, and
distrusting populations.49
Additionally, a lack of political will within the state regime is a common
obstacle in post-conflict countries.50 Effective rule of law reform in
devastated countries requires enormous amounts of political will, which in
turn requires broad consensus and the creation of a united strategy among a
country’s important stakeholders.51 This requires that a state’s general
population support the actions being undertaken by the state. Yet, there is
often a general lack of public confidence in state institutions and governing
structures in countries emerging from conflict.52 Even where institutions
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id. at 944–45.
See Kamali, supra note 30, at 96.
See Kritz, supra note 33, at 127.
Id. at 127–28.
See Juan E. Méndez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1, 1 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997) (“In fact,
the pursuit of retrospective justice is an urgent task of democratization, as it highlights the
fundamental character of the new order to be established, an order based on the rule of law
and on respect for the dignity and worth of each human person.”).
47. Peerenboom, supra note 38, at 908.
48. Id.
49. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 3 (“[H]elping war-torn societies reestablish the rule of law and come to terms with large-scale past abuses, all within a context
marked by devastated institutions, exhausted resources, and diminished security and a
traumatized and divided population, is a daunting, often overwhelming, task.”).
50. Peerenboom, supra note 39, at 909 (describing how many reconstruction efforts fail
due to lack of political will, lack of resources, and lack of funds).
51. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 20 (arguing that inadequate investment
in public consultations on reform questions and a consensus among important stakeholders
about the nature of necessary reforms leads to inadequate establishment of the rule of law in
post-conflict states).
52. See id. ¶ 3.
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were once credible, years of war and repressive dictatorship can lead to
these institutions being tainted by corruption, thus contributing to a
perceived lack of legitimacy by the public.53 Moving ahead with
transitional justice mechanisms without addressing the public’s skepticism
of the state’s legitimacy can hinder the state’s pursuits.54
Beyond the problems of political will and public support, post-conflict
countries also face a significant hurdle from a lack of resources—structural,
technical, and material. Countries that have experienced conflict are often
left with considerably damaged infrastructures.55 Thus, state institutions
may be minimally functional, with limited capacity to address the process
of rebuilding.56 Additionally, the technical capacity available to address the
multitude of complex questions faced by the state can be limited.57 Lastly,
any transitional justice mechanism requires a large influx of funds and other
material resources that are often unavailable.58 Thus, given the multitude of
problems inherent in many post-conflict situations, any approach to justice
undertaken by a state must factor in these difficulties.
C. Nepal’s Human Rights Obligations Under International Law
The transitional justice mechanisms employed by a state must be aligned
with the state’s human rights obligations. This is particularly true in postconflict situations where the rule of law and the legitimacy of state regimes
already rest on a precarious foundation.59 How to handle persons accused
of human rights abuses is a particularly difficult question, as it requires
states to strike a balance between its various obligations to victims, the
accused, and the general population.60
53. See Neil J. Kritz, Where We Are and How We Got Here: An Overview of
Developments in the Search for Justice and Reconciliation, in THE LEGACY OF ABUSE:
CONFRONTING THE PAST, FACING THE FUTURE 21, 30 (Alice H. Henkin ed., 2002) (noting
how civil war or years under repressive dictatorship can destroy criminal justice systems or
leave them tainted by corruption, even where the judicial institutions and their personnel
were once credible).
54. See Kamali, supra note 30, at 93 (“Hasty prosecutions of human rights violators by a
legal system that is incapable of handling numerous cases or that has not yet gained
legitimacy in the eyes of the public would have the opposite effect of its intended pursuit of
justice.”).
55. See Serge Rumin, Gathering and Managing Information in Vetting Processes, in
JUSTICE AS PREVENTION: VETTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 403, 408
(Alexander Mayer-Rieckh & Pablo de Greiff eds., 2007) (“Conflicts often bring about the
destruction of countries’ infrastructure and institutions.”).
56. See, e.g., Kritz, supra note 53, at 35 (“The criminal justice system of every country
emerging from a pattern of mass abuses is compromised and minimally functional, with
severely limited capacity at best.”).
57. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 27; see also Posner & Vermeule, supra
note 31, at 766 (“Purges, for example, can further political reform by eliminating the
influence of officials of the prior regime, but they can also interfere with political reform by
depriving the new state of skilled administrators.”).
58. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 64(l).
59. See supra Part I.B.2.
60. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 7 (“Justice implies regard for the rights
of the accused, for the interests of victims and for the well-being of society at large.”).
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1. Sources of Nepal’s Human Rights Obligations
In 1991, Nepal became a party to most of the major international human
rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights61 (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights62 (ICESCR), and the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment63 (CAT). Along
with its international treaty obligations, Nepal is bound by customary
international law, which consists of fundamental provisions of international
human rights law that have obtained customary international status and thus
form part of general international law.64
Domestically, the provisions of the human rights treaties to which Nepal
is a party are incorporated into, and enforceable as part of, Nepal’s domestic
law through the Nepal Treaty Act.65 Nepal’s Interim Constitution further
establishes that the government is responsible for adopting a political
system fully aligned with fundamental human rights, the rule of law, and
the elimination of impunity.66 Nepal’s government is also responsible for
effectively implementing international treaties to which Nepal is a party67
and must have as one of its key objectives the promotion of the general
welfare by making provisions for the protection and promotion of human
rights.68
2. The State’s Duty to Prevent Human Rights Violations
As a state party to the ICCPR, Nepal must guarantee the full enjoyment
of fundamental human rights.69 Thus, Nepal has a duty to prevent human

61. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm; Ratification of International Human Rights
Treaties—Nepal, U. MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR., http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/
ratification-nepal.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Ratification of Treaties—
Nepal].
62. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm; Ratification of Treaties—Nepal, supra note
61.
63. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
[hereinafter CAT], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm; Ratification of
Treaties—Nepal, supra note 61.
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987).
65. Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, ¶ 9, Nov. 9, 1990, available at http://www.lawcommission.
gov.np/en/documents/prevailing-laws/prevailing-acts.html.
66. NEPAL INTERIM CONST. art. 33(c), available at http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/
en/documents/prevailing-laws/constitution.html.
67. Id. art. 33(m).
68. Id. art. 34(2).
69. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 2(3). Nepal became party to the ICCPR in 1991. See
Ratification of Treaties—Nepal, supra note 61.
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rights violations70 and to end impunity for human rights abuses that
occurred during its ten-year conflict.71 This duty to prevent and punish
human rights abuses is part of its obligation to guarantee the full enjoyment
of rights and has been reaffirmed under international jurisprudence.72
The duty to prevent human rights violations calls into question the
practice of allowing persons implicated in human rights abuses to serve in a
state’s public institutions.73 As a means of guaranteeing the nonoccurrence
of human rights violations, it has been recommended that states remove
officials who have been found responsible for human rights violations from
public service.74 This includes refraining from hiring or recruiting persons
implicated in human rights violations, and permanently removing members
of a state’s security forces implicated in such violations.75
The duty extends to the suspension of state agents implicated in human
rights violations while investigations into the alleged abuses are ongoing.76
This has been especially important when the individual is accused of forced
disappearances;77 extralegal, arbitrary, and summary executions;78 or
torture.79
70. Federico Andreu-Guzmán, Due Process and Vetting, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION,
supra note 55, at 449, 450.
71. Id. at 449.
72. See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Husband of Maria Fanny Suarez de
Guerrero v. Colombia, Commc’n No. 45/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979 (1982),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/44cf17fed78ca4e7c1256ab5002b7234?
Opendocument. Although Nepal is not a state party to the regional human rights bodies that
have adjudicated on this issue, those decisions hold the weight of customary international
law and point to the rising status of this duty within international human rights law. See
Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 166, 174 (July 29, 1988);
Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, App. No. 22535/93, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 102 (2000).
73. Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 70, at 450 (“The duty to prevent raises the question as
to the presence in the public administration . . . of persons implicated in gross human rights
violations.”).
74. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, Principle 36(a), U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005).
75. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Argentina, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/70/ARG (Nov. 15, 2000), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3b39f0977.pdf; U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Brazil, ¶ 325, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.66 (July 24, 1999) [hereinafter Concluding Observations: Brazil],
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/9d8f4abc5536855fc12563ea0057
e768?Opendocument; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Guatemala, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.63 (Apr. 3, 1996),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/176bb26c29e92ac2c12563dc0050f64a?
Opendocument; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Serbia & Montenegro, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/81/SEMO (Aug. 12, 2004),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/c4f9dd7baa1e61aec1256ee1004c4a96?Open
document.
76. Concluding Observations: Brazil, supra note 75, ¶ 325.
77. See Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A.
Res. 47/133, art. 16(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133 (Dec. 18, 1992) (providing that alleged
perpetrators of a forced disappearance must be suspended from any official duties during the
investigation into the crime).
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3. Victims’ Rights to an Effective Remedy
Turning to the victims of abuses, where a person’s human rights have
been violated, there are rights held by the victim that must be protected.
One of the overarching rights is the right to an effective remedy.80 In
respecting this right, the state has the obligation to ensure that individuals
have remedies that are both accessible and effective.81 The right to an
effective remedy is an obligation inherent in the ICCPR that must be
complied with even in times of emergency.82 Connected to this is the duty
to take state action against those implicated in human rights violations.83
To fully give effect to the rights of victims, all human rights and
international humanitarian law violations must be thoroughly investigated
and, if appropriate, prosecuted and punished.84 Failing to do so may give
rise to a separate breach by the state of its human rights obligations.85
The duty to conduct official investigations into allegations of human
rights violations for which complaints have been filed, or which are
otherwise known, is presumed by the U.N. Human Rights Committee
(HRC), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the European

78. See Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary
and Summary Executions, E.S.C. Res. 1989/65, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1989/65 (May 24,
1989).
79. See Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 55/89, ¶ 3(b), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/55/89 (Dec. 4, 2000) (stating that persons involved in such crimes must be
“removed from any position of control or power, whether direct or indirect, over
complainants, witnesses and their families, as well as those conducting the investigation”).
80. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 2(3)(a); U.N. Human Rights Comm., The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
0/58f5d4646e861359c1256ff600533f5f?Opendocument
[hereinafter
General
Legal
Obligation].
81. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., George Kazantzis v. Cyprus, Comment No.
972/2001, ¶ 6.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/972/2001 (2003), available at http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/country,,HRC,,CYP,,4282286d4,0.html.
82. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Article 4: Derogations During a State of
Emergency, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/453883fd1f.pdf (describing the right to an effective
remedy as a “fundamental obligation” that cannot be derogated from).
83. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21,
2006).
84. See id. (“In cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious
violations of international humanitarian law constituting crimes under international law,
States have the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to
prosecution the person allegedly responsible for the violations and, if found guilty, the duty
to punish her or him.”).
85. See General Legal Obligation, supra note 80, ¶ 18 (“As with failure to investigate,
failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a
separate breach of the Covenant.”).
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Court of Human Rights to be a measure owed to the individual victim.86
These bodies also stress that the obligation to investigate is born once
authorities gain knowledge of alleged misconduct and does not rest on
whether an individual has lodged a formal complaint.87 Additionally, these
bodies have held that state officials implicated in human rights offenses
should be suspended pending completion of investigations into the
allegations.88
Once investigations are completed, there is a further duty to bring
criminal prosecutions against those who have been implicated.89 This is
necessary not only to protect the rights of victims but also to preserve the
rule of law.90 Specific provisions lay out the duty to prosecute specific
types of crimes. Each of the four Geneva Conventions, which govern war
crimes and grave breaches of human rights during international armed
conflict, imposes a duty to search for persons who have allegedly
committed crimes, to provide penal sanctions, and to bring alleged
perpetrators to justice.91 Regarding crimes against humanity, HRC General
Comment Number 31 discussing duties under the ICCPR provides that,
86. ANJA SEIBERT-FOHR, PROSECUTING SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 190
(2009). States have the duty to combat impunity and to ensure effective investigation and
prosecution of those responsible for serious violations of international law. See U.N. Human
Rights Council, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General, ¶ 55, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/12/18 (Aug. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Report of the High Commissioner].
87. See, e.g., Musayeva v. Russia, App. No. 74239/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 85–86 (2007)
(reiterating that “authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their
attention”); Yaşa v. Turkey, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 98, 100 (stating that the mere fact that
authorities were informed about the murder of a victim led “ipso facto to an obligation under
Article 2 to carry out an effective investigation”).
88. See, e.g., Concluding Observations: Brazil, supra note 75, ¶ 325 (stating that “the
forces against whom allegations of such offences are being investigated be suspended from
their posts pending completion of the investigation”); Special Rapporteur on Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Question of Torture, ¶ 26(k), U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2003/68 (Dec. 17, 2002) (by Theo van
Boven) (suggesting that when complaints have been lodged against an official, the public
officials should be suspended unless the allegation is “manifestly ill-founded”).
89. The Inter-American Court and Commission have found an individual right to
criminal prosecution and punishment of those found responsible for serious human rights
violations. See SEIBERT-FOHR, supra note 86, at 191.
90. Id. at 189.
91. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/365?OpenDocument (setting out states’
obligations during periods of international and internal armed conflict); Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/370?OpenDocument (same); Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/375?OpenDocument (same); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 146, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/
380?OpenDocument (same). Nepal became a party to the Geneva Conventions in 1964. See
Ratification of Treaties—Nepal, supra note 61.
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where investigations lead to information about perpetrators, “failure to
bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give
rise to a separate breach of the Covenant.”92 Similarly, the CAT requires
that all cases of alleged torture be submitted to the proper authorities for
prosecution.93
4. Due Process Rights of the Accused
Any state action against those accused of human rights violations must be
undertaken in a manner that respects the due process rights of the accused.
Due process and fair trial rights are guaranteed under international
standards and have become a jus cogens94 norm of international criminal
law.95 Due process guarantees, among other things, the presumption of
innocence, the right to a defense and to be assisted by counsel, the right to
prior and detailed notice of charges, and the right to appeal judgments to a
higher court.96
The presumption of innocence is one of the most fundamental due
process rights held by the accused.97 Any action taken against those
accused of human rights abuses must ensure that criminal guilt does not
attach prior to proof of guilt.98 With regard to public officials accused of
abuses, the right to hold a job in public service in conditions of equality and
without unlawful discrimination or unreasonable restrictions may be
implicated.99 While the right does not entitle every citizen guaranteed
employment in the public service sector, it does necessitate a right of equal
access to such positions.100 This right has also been interpreted to
encompass the freedom to engage in political activity, to debate about
public affairs, and to criticize the existing government.101
92. General Legal Obligation, supra note 80, ¶ 18.
93. CAT, supra note 63, arts. 4(1), 7(1).
94. Jus cogens refers to norms “accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm for general international law having the same
character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
95. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 252 (2d ed. 2008) (“It is tenable that the principle of due process and fair
trial has evolved to a jus cogens norm of [international criminal law] . . . .”).
96. Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 70, at 463.
97. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 14(2).
98. Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 70, at 463.
99. See ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 25.
100. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Wieslaw Kall v. Poland, Comment No. 552/1993,
¶ 13.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/552/1993 (1997), available at http://sim.law.uu.nl/
SIM/CaseLaw/fulltextccpr.nsf/160f6e7f0fb318e8c1256d410033e0a1/49c77b8ab56f2eed412
56d64003865d9?OpenDocument.
101. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Adimayo M. Aduayom, Sofianou T. Diasso and Yawo
S. Dobou v. Togo, Comment Nos. 422/1990, 423/1990, 424/1990, ¶ 7.5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990, 424/1990 (1996), available at http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/undocs/html/VWS422R1.htm (“The rights enshrined in article 25 should also be
read to encompass the freedom to engage in political activity individually or through
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Procedural rights are also implicated. The core procedural right is the
right to have one’s case heard fairly and publicly “by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”102 The U.N.
Secretary-General has identified the following procedural guarantees for
those accused of human rights violations: the right to be informed of
allegations against them, the right to address the entity in charge of the
investigation, the right to be informed of the charges within a reasonable
time, and the right to appeal an adverse decision to a court or other
independent body.103
D. Transitional Justice Mechanisms and the Rule of Law
Given the unique nature of conflicts faced by individual countries, the
response of new regimes can vary widely.104 Criminal proceedings,
administrative sanctions, and truth commissions are often used as responses
to the different needs and problems emerging during a conflict’s aftermath
that operate to address periods of massive human rights violations.105
1. Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions
Criminal proceedings can play a vital role in transitional contexts for
many reasons. One of the benefits resulting from bringing those
responsible for serious human rights violations to justice in a public manner
is the restoration of dignity for victims.106 Furthermore, the victim’s
opportunity to witness human rights abusers answer for their crimes may
restore the victim’s sense of justice.107
For the larger society, public denunciation of criminal behavior
demarcates the regime of the past from the regime of the present and sends
a credible signal to the public that the new order is committed to the rule of
law.108 This hopefully infuses individuals with greater public confidence in
the new regime’s ability, willingness, and commitment to enforce both
domestic and international laws.109 The declaration of a commitment to
prosecute violators of human rights and the consequential rise in the

political parties, freedom to debate public affairs, to criticize the Government and to publish
material with political content.”).
102. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 14(1).
103. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 52.
104. See Peerenboom, supra note 38, at 908.
105. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 8.
106. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542 (1991) (arguing that the inherent
dignity of individuals can be restored through trials).
107. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 39.
108. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 128 (“A public airing and condemnation of these crimes
may be the best way to draw a line between times past and present, lest the public perceive
the new order as simply more of the same.”).
109. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 39.
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public’s confidence in the new regime help establish the rule of law in the
post-conflict regime.110
The direct accountability provided by criminal trials also furthers the
goal of deterrence.111 Criminal prosecutions play an essential role in
preventing the reoccurrence of human rights abuses, both individually with
regard to the perpetrator and generally with regard to society as a whole.112
By deterring further abuses, criminal prosecutions contribute to the
establishment of peace.113
2. Administrative Sanctions
Vetting is the process by which an individual’s integrity is assessed for
the purpose of determining his or her suitability for employment as a public
official.114 From the transitional justice perspective, the most important
consideration in evaluating suitability is a person’s observance of human
rights standards and professional conduct.115 This extends beyond the
individual to the institutional level, such that the institutions most complicit
in engaging in human rights violations during the conflict must also be
vetted.116 Removing from service those officials responsible for violations
of human rights is critical in the transformation of a society into one run by
institutions that respect human rights.117 Ultimately, the goal of vetting is
to build fair and effective institutions that are able to prevent future
recurrences of the human rights abuses that plagued a society’s past.118
The intended end result of a vetting process is the identification and
exclusion from public offices of individuals found to be responsible for
110. See Kritz, supra note 53, at 25 (arguing that criminal prosecutions replace impunity
with accountability and establish credibility for distrusted institutions).
111. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 39.
112. See Orentlicher, supra note 106, at 2542 (stating that the arguments in favor of
criminal punishment rest on the idea that “it is the most effective insurance against future
repression”).
113. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 38.
114. See Ved P. Nanda, Civil and Political Sanctions As an Accountability Mechanism for
Massive Violations of Human Rights, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 389, 396 (1998)
(describing vetting as the exclusion from public office and positions of influence those who
are found to have committed serious violations of human rights).
115. See U.N. Dev. Programme, Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery, Vetting Public
Employees in Post-conflict Settings: Operational Guidelines, INT’L CENTER TRANSITIONAL
JUST., 20 (2006), http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-UNDP-Global-Vetting-OperationalGuidelines-2006-English.pdf (describing gross violations of human rights as serious crimes,
involvement in which “indicate[s] a lack of integrity at a level that fundamentally affects a
person’s credibility to hold public service”).
116. Roger Duthie, Introduction, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION, supra note 55, at 17, 20–21.
117. See Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 70, at 470 (stating that the question of vetting
proceedings “is crucial for the effectiveness of the rule of law, the strengthening,
construction, or reconstruction of a state that guarantees human rights, and the restoration of
the public’s confidence”).
118. See Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 86, ¶ 37; see also W. Michael
Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human Rights, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 75 (1996) (citing the “fundamental sanctioning goals” as being
the “protection, restoration, and improvement of public order”).
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abuses.119 Generally speaking, individuals who are under investigation are
notified of the allegations against them, given the opportunity to respond to
the allegations, and provided the right to appeal an adverse decision to
another independent body.120 The resulting exclusions tend to be
temporary and are meant to provide a new regime with a period during
which the people’s confidence in the governing institutions can be reformed
before allowing members of the old regime to participate again.121
Administrative sanctions have long been used to address serious
violations of human rights.122 Due to its importance as a component of
transitional justice and the establishment of the rule of law, vetting is a
mechanism that has been applied to a large number of people in postconflict situations.123 This mechanism provides protection for newly
formed democratic states from the dangers associated with institutions run
by untrustworthy or insufficiently loyal officials.124 Furthermore, vetting
helps facilitate the establishment of the rule of law in new regimes by
sending a “salutary signal” to victims and to society that those responsible
for human rights violations will not be permitted to stay in power, thus
adding to the credibility of post-conflict regimes.125
Transitions require that public institutions previously complicit in
perpetuating conflict “be transformed into institutions that sustain peace,
protect human rights, and foster a culture of respect for the rule of law.”126
The vetting or screening of public officials for human rights violations
committed in the past has proven to be critical as an accountability
mechanism127 and for strengthening institutions in post-conflict societies.128
119. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 52. For purposes of vetting, exclusion
includes both the termination and restriction of access to public employment. See AndreuGuzmán, supra note 70, at 452.
120. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 52.
121. Kritz, supra note 33, at 139.
122. After World War II, many European countries used civil and political sanctions
against those who had aligned themselves with the Nazis. See Nanda, supra note 114, at 390.
For example, France sanctioned more than 7,500 alleged collaborators with the Vichy
regime, which led to the removal from office of over nearly 1,500 politicians and diplomats.
See Kritz, supra note 33, at 139. Also, Italian authorities temporarily dismissed nearly 1,600
government employees based on their wartime activities and human rights violations. See id.
123. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 139–40 (arguing that vetting mechanisms make more
plausible the ability to process large numbers of potential cases as often exist in post-conflict
situations); see also U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 52 (noting how U.N.
assistance has frequently been sought in vetting processes).
124. Jiri Priban, Oppressors and Their Victims: The Czech Lustration Law and the Rule
of Law, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION, supra note 55, at 308, 318 (noting how the Constitutional
Court of the Czech Republic upheld the constitutionality of the lustration law as an
instrument “requesting the political loyalty of civil servants and protecting the democratic
regime against political threats”).
125. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 52; Kritz, supra note 33, at 140; Nanda,
supra note 114, at 396.
126. Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 86, ¶ 37.
127. See Nanda, supra note 114, at 389 (“Civil and political sanctions applied on an
individual basis and with due process for the defendant serve an important function as one of
the accountability mechanisms available to redress massive violations of human rights.”).
128. Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 22.
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3. Truth Commissions
Truth commissions are temporary, nonjudicial, official bodies created to
understand the broader causes, consequences, and patterns of past human
rights violations that occurred during a conflict.129 This broader analysis
can include an investigation of the structural elements of the government
and security forces that allowed human rights abuses to occur.130 The
impetus behind truth commissions is the belief that understanding why
events occurred can be as important as knowing exactly what happened.131
Ultimately, the work of a truth commission helps a society transition toward
peace by creating an official and public acknowledgement of the past,
allowing the voices of victims to be heard, and submitting
recommendations for reforms needed to prevent further abuses.132
To achieve its goals, the core activities of truth commissions include
taking statements, investigating, researching, holding public hearings, and
creating a final public report.133 Statement taking involves obtaining
statements directly from victims and witnesses of human rights violations in
a process designed to allow them to recount their experiences in a safe
environment.134 With regard to investigations and research, commissions
will typically select a few emblematic cases for investigation.135 Public
hearings conducted by the commission give victims and survivors the
opportunity to share their stories in front of a public audience and thus serve
as a forum for publicly acknowledging past wrongs.136 This not only gives
victims the opportunity to be heard and to have their stories be made part of
the country’s official records, but it can also facilitate a public debate about
how to address the past.137 The work that a commission does is
incorporated into a final report that summarizes its findings and provides
recommendations for reforms to the state.138
Truth commissions have been established as a means of addressing
historical injustices in various contexts worldwide and have enjoyed

129. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 141 (stating that truth commissions are perceived to be
legitimate and impartial official bodies charged with investigating violations of human rights
under the conflict in question and producing an official history of the abuses); see also
Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-conflict
States: Truth Commissions, 1–2, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/1 (2006) [hereinafter Rule-of-Law
Tools: Truth Commissions].
130. Kritz, supra note 33, at 141.
131. See Rule-of-Law Tools: Truth Commissions, supra note 129, at 1–2.
132. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 141 (noting the cathartic effects that the public airing of
the pain inflicted during the conflict period and the creation of an official record of the truth
can have).
133. See Rule-of-Law Tools: Truth Commissions, supra note 129, at 1.
134. Id. at 17.
135. Id. at 18.
136. Id.
137. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 50; see also Kritz, supra note 33, at
141.
138. See Rule-of-Law Tools: Truth Commissions, supra note 129, at 19.

2012]

A CALL TO ACTION

957

varying levels of effectiveness.139 They play an important role in providing
a full account of past human rights violations and addressing the larger
context and root causes of a conflict.140 Furthermore, they can serve many
reconciliatory purposes such as giving voice to victims, providing
meaningful societal acknowledgement of the abuses that occurred, and
educating the public.141 Truth commissions can also be necessary due to
the high levels of corruption and incompetence within the security forces
and the judiciary in transitional states; they can provide a way to avoid
postponing justice until the existing institutions are adequately reformed.142
Ultimately, truth commissions can play an important role in fostering
accountability, preserving evidence, and identifying perpetrators of
crimes.143
II. IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS AND STRATEGIES IN POSTCONFLICT SITUATIONS
Every country in a post-conflict situation must grapple with the question
of how best to embark upon the journey toward a new society. Still, every
transition must be framed by a set of minimum standards in which domestic
and international laws are respected. Part II of this Note first explores the
ability of each of the aforementioned transitional justice mechanisms to
enable a state to meet its human rights obligations in post-conflict
situations. It then compares these mechanisms to the current methods
employed by the government of Nepal in addressing the abuses that
occurred during Nepal’s civil war.
A. Achieving Balance in the Use of Transitional Justice Mechanisms in a
Post-conflict Society
Criminal proceedings, administrative sanctions, and truth commissions
serve different functions and thereby make different contributions to
restoration in post-conflict societies. This section will look at the benefits
and drawbacks of each mechanism in relation to international human rights
obligations and at how the three mechanisms can interact together in postconflict societies.

139. See id. at 20 (comparing the relative effectiveness of different truth commissions).
140. See Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice:
Amnesties, Truth
Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481, 484 (2003).
141. Id.
142. See Kristin Bohl, Breaking the Rules of Transitional Justice, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 557,
573 (2006) (“In addition, some scholars explain that truth commissions become necessary in
light of the corruption and incompetence of both the police and the judiciary in many
transitional states. By circumventing the ‘normal investigatory channels,’ truth commissions
avoid postponing justice until an independent, capable judiciary is established, constitutional
reforms are implemented, and political concerns about the power of the past regime are
overcome.” (quoting Juan Méndez, Book Review, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 577, 584
(1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 50.
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1. Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions
Criminal proceedings offer a number of benefits in a post-conflict
society, including reestablishing public confidence in government
institutions144 and the rule of law.145 History has shown that the
investigation and prosecution of a nation’s leaders for human rights abuses
can benefit countries emerging from conflict.
For example, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia indicted
Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic and four other top officials for
multiple counts of alleged human rights abuses and war crimes.146
Conventional wisdom at the time was that an indictment against a top
official would serve only to disrupt the peace process by making Milosevic
unwilling to contribute to negotiations aimed at ending the armed
conflict.147 Instead, a week later, Milosevic had accepted the terms of an
international peace plan for Kosovo.148 In this example, provisions relating
to accountability did not interfere with peace but helped to establish a
foundation for emergence from conflict.
Criminal prosecutions do, however, face unique limitations as
mechanisms of transitional justice. In post-conflict situations that involve
mass conflict, the sheer number of potential criminals to process through
the criminal justice system can overwhelm an already fragile judicial
system.149 Thus, in virtually all cases of mass abuse, accountability through
criminal prosecutions must be sought selectively.150 A state seeking to hold
responsible those who have violated human rights must use pragmatism to

144. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
146. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, President
Milosevic and Four Other Senior Fry Officials Indicted for Murder, Persecution and
Deportation in Kosovo, U.N. Press Release JL/PIU/403-E (May 27, 1999), available at
http://www.icty.org/sid/7765.
147. Marcus Tanner, War in the Balkans: Milosevic Charge Splits Allies, INDEPENDENT
(May 28, 1999), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/war-in-the-balkans-milosevic-chargesplits-allies-1096257.html.
148. Milosevic Accepts Peace Plan, Finnish Envoy Says, CNN (June 3, 1999, 9:12 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9906/03/kosovo.peace.04/.
149. See Peerenboom, supra note 39, at 907–08 (“In the wake of regime change in failed
and transitional states in particular, the legal system is often weak or non-existent.”); see also
Kritz, supra note 53, at 35 (arguing that in societies that have witnessed systematic patterns
of atrocity that consistently violated human rights, every person in the system is potentially
implicated in the crimes committed); Orentlicher, supra note 106, at 2596 (arguing that even
under a well-established judicial system, prosecuting all those responsible for crimes would
be virtually impossible). An example of a country undergoing a difficulty like this one is
Rwanda, where insisting that every person who participated in the genocide be prosecuted
would have led to putting more than 100,000 Rwandans on trial, which would have been
unmanageable and destabilizing in a country whose criminal justice system was decimated.
See Kritz, supra note 33, at 135.
150. Kritz, supra note 33, at 138; Peerenboom, supra note 38, at 917 (“[T]he reality is
that relatively few people are ever prosecuted either in domestic or international courts for
their participation in mass societal violence, war crimes or abuses under authoritarian
regimes.”).
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temper an absolutist approach to criminal prosecutions, making strategic
choices in structuring criminal prosecution systems.151
2. Administrative Sanctions
In certain situations, noncriminal mechanisms may be a better method of
pursuing justice for violators of human rights abuses.152 In most Eastern
and Central European countries, lustration was the administrative
mechanism used in lieu of criminal prosecutions.153 Czechoslovakia was
among the first to adopt lustration laws in Eastern Europe.154 These laws
prohibited former Communist officials and secret police collaborators from
holding a variety of public positions, including positions in the state
administration, the army, the federal police, the judiciary, state-owned
businesses, and academic institutions.155 These laws were inherited by the
Czech Republic but not by Slovakia when the two nations split.156 The
resulting difference in the integrity of those in public service was ultimately
a factor in the Czech Republic’s transition to a liberal democracy as
compared to Slovakia’s subsequent authoritarian regime.157
In practice, however, civil and political sanctions have rarely been
applied fairly.158 For one, such procedures may violate the right to the
presumption of innocence since public officials may be removed from
office prior to undergoing a process through which guilt is determined.159
As one commentator notes, “It is very important that the trials are not
conducted as ‘witch hunts,’ where the accused are summarily found guilty
without any sort of due process rights to answer their accusers.”160
Additionally, the procedural right to have one’s case heard fairly and
151. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 46 (advocating that a state’s prosecutorial
strategy must be strategic due to the reality that the vast majority of human rights
perpetrators will never be tried); Kritz, supra note 53, at 35 (“Attempting to prosecute or
purge all those implicated would be politically destabilizing, economically devastating and
logistically impossible.”).
152. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 135 (“[I]n most cases of mass abuse, those whose
offenses were minimal should probably be handled through a non-criminal mechanism
. . . .”).
153. Nanda, supra note 114, at 393.
154. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 31, at 802.
155. Id. at 806; see also Nanda, supra note 114, at 393–94. The lustration laws
prohibited certain persons from having access to key positions in the public administration
and the judiciary because of the posts they previously held. See Posner & Vermeule, supra
note 31, at 806.
156. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 31, at 807.
157. Id.
158. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 140.
159. See Mark Gibney, Decommunization: Human Rights Lessons from the Past and
Present, and Prospects for the Future, 23 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 87, 124 (1994).
160. Adrienne M. Quill, Comment, To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute: Problems
Encountered in the Prosecution of Former Communist Officials in Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and the Czech Republic, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 165, 190 (1996); see
also Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 70, at 449 (arguing that vetting procedures “raise the
question of the rights of the persons targeted by such measures, for in the past these
measures have repeatedly assumed the dimensions of veritable purges or witch hunts”).
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publicly by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal161 may be
implicated.162 Another common concern with vetting processes is that they
tend to be conducted on a large-scale basis and thus fail to provide the level
of individual due process protections to defendants as would be found in
traditional criminal proceedings.163 Vetting processes tend to bar entire
groups of people from holding public positions, which “smacks of imposing
collective guilt.”164
Some international bodies have implied, however, that administrative
sanctions may by themselves be insufficient. Vetting procedures are
administrative by nature in that the aim is to prevent further perpetuations
of regimes in which human rights violations run rampant.165 They are not
“punitive per se” and thus cannot be seen as a replacement for criminal
prosecutions aimed at determining an individual’s criminal liability.166 In
Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia,167 the HRC rejected the notion that
disciplinary sanctions and judgments of an administrative tribunal could
constitute an effective remedy.168 Rather, the HRC said that purely
disciplinary and administrative remedies were inadequate under the
effective remedy provision of Article 2(3) of the ICCPR.169 Again, the
HRC reiterated that state parties are under a duty to thoroughly investigate
violations of human rights and to criminally prosecute those found
responsible.170
When used in combination with other transitional mechanisms, vetting
and the application of civil or political sanctions can be extremely effective
in helping a country transition toward peace. For example, under the Peace
Accords in El Salvador, two commissions were appointed—a Truth
Commission and an Ad Hoc Commission.171 The Truth Commission was
tasked with investigating serious allegations of human rights violations and
taking measures necessary to prevent the repetition of such crimes.172
161. ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 14(1).
162. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Felix Enrique Chira Vargas-Machuca v. Peru,
Comment No. 906/2000, ¶ 7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/906/2000 (2002), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/906-2000.html (holding that Article 14(1)
guarantees everyone the right to a hearing by an impartial tribunal or court, including the
right of access to a civil court).
163. Kritz, supra note 33, at 140.
164. See Nanda, supra note 114, at 397; see also U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28,
¶ 52 (noting how vetting processes without due process elements can become wholesale
purges involving wide-scale dismissal and disqualification based on party affiliation,
political opinion, or association with a prior State institution instead of on individual
records).
165. See Andreu-Guzmán, supra note 70, at 455.
166. See id. at 455–56.
167. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Comment No. 563/1993, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993 (1995), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session
55/vws56355.htm.
168. Id. ¶ 10.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Nanda, supra note 114, at 392.
172. Id.
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Alongside the Truth Commission, El Salvador’s Ad Hoc Commission was
given the task of cleansing the military by making recommendations about
the transfer or discharge of military officers based on their past history of
human rights abuses.173
Ultimately, the Ad Hoc Commission
recommended the transfer or discharge of 102 active-duty officers.174 In
addition to cleansing the army, the implementation of the recommendations
from the Ad Hoc Commission led to a “greater degree of accountability
than many in El Salvador had thought possible.”175 Thus, administrative
sanctions have been shown to positively affect a transitional state when
used in conjunction with other transitional justice mechanisms.
3. Truth Commissions
Truth commissions, while an important component of transitions, cannot
themselves sufficiently provide justice.176 Truth commissions serve many
important functions in post-conflict situations, such as providing a full
account of the given conflict and ensuring that victims are fully heard.177
Still, while it is generally recognized that truth commissions can positively
complement criminal tribunals,178 they are by themselves an incomplete
method of establishing the rule of law and addressing past abuses, as they
are limited in function.179
By mandate, truth commissions are investigative, nonjudicial bodies and
thus do not have any prosecutorial powers.180 They cannot determine
culpability, punish perpetrators, or have their recommendations enforced.181
Thus, the idea that truth commissions and criminal trials are mutually
exclusive is a misperception, and a common one at that.182 Rather, it is
through the judicial system’s criminal justice mechanisms that the need for

173. See id. at 393.
174. Id.
175. Kritz, supra note 33, at 140.
176. Id. at 141 (arguing that truth commissions cannot substitute for prosecutions); see
also Bohl, supra note 142, at 573 (“[T]ruth commissions suffice only as complements, not
replacements, for prosecutions.”).
177. See Amnesty Int’l, Truth, Justice and Reparation: Establishing an Effective Truth
Commission 1, AI Index POL 30/009/2007 (June 11, 2007), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/009/2007/en/77ee33de-d38a-11dd-a3292f46302a8cc6/pol300092007en.pdf (showing how truth commissions “can play an important
role in providing a full account of past human rights violations, contributing to their
investigation and eventual prosecution, preventing their repetition, and ensuring that victims
and their relatives are provided with full reparation”).
178. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 26.
179. See Bohl, supra note 142, at 575 (“The positive by-products of their efforts are
undeniable, but any government seeking to facilitate a just transition must view truth
commissions merely as predecessors or complements to prosecutions, not as
replacements.”).
180. See Rule-of-Law Tools: Truth Commissions, supra note 129, at 1.
181. Id. at 11.
182. Kritz, supra note 33, at 143.
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accountability, deterrence, and guarantees of nonrepetition is more
adequately met.183
It is the practice of many truth commissions to hold themselves out as
favorable toward prosecutions for violations of international law.184 Many
truth commissions recommend that the evidence gathered through their
proceedings be handed over to the prosecuting authorities to be used in
further judicial investigations and potential criminal prosecutions for the
events documented.185 For example, the vast amounts of information
produced by the Argentinean truth commission were used to prosecute
members of the military junta implicated in human rights abuses.186
Additionally, in Peru, a special investigation unit was created to investigate
cases of human rights violations in which there was information of clear
individual responsibility and the evidence gathered was submitted to the
prosecutor’s office for potential prosecution.187 Similarly, in Chile, a truth
commission was able to establish individual responsibility in a number of
cases and the list of alleged perpetrators was then submitted to the Chilean
President to further the cases against those individuals.188 These examples
serve to affirm the importance of justice as an objective in its own right—
one that cannot easily be supplanted by the existence of a truth commission.
Truth commissions, then, must remain part of a comprehensive transitional
justice strategy.189
B. Transitional Justice Mechanisms at Play in Nepal
During Nepal’s ten-year conflict, thousands of people died at the hands
of both the state government and the Maoist army.190 This section
examines the methods utilized by the Nepali government in addressing
Nepal’s history of human rights abuses. It begins by looking at the status of
criminal investigations and prosecutions in the country. It then looks at the
government’s use of amnesties, pardons, and withdrawals in dealing with
human rights violators. Finally, this section examines Nepal’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.

183. Bidhya Chapagain, Withdrawal of Criminal Charges: Mockery of National
Framework and International Commitments, 31 INFORMAL 27, 31 (2011).
184. Amnesty Int’l, Commissioning Justice: Truth Commissions and Criminal Justice 16,
AI Index POL 30/004/201 (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.amnesty.org/
en/library/asset/POL30/004/2010/en/1f74d7de-f82d-4942-8b3a-a5f8f7858d77/pol30004201
0en.pdf [hereinafter Commissioning Justice].
185. Rule-of-Law Tools: Truth Commissions, supra note 129, at 11.
186. Commissioning Justice, supra note 184, at 17.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Rule-of-Law Tools: Truth Commissions, supra note 129, at 5 (stating as a
general principle that truth commissions should be coupled with other initiatives such as
prosecutions, reparations, vetting, and other accountability or reform programs).
190. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
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1. Status of Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions
Nepal’s Supreme Court has acknowledged the duty to thoroughly
investigate alleged abuses. For example, in the December 14, 2009,
judgment in the cases of murder victims Reena Rasaili and Subadhra
Chaulagain, the court explicitly held that the State had a responsibility to
investigate and prosecute cases involving human rights violations.191 In its
decision, the court stated that “[a]n act declared a crime by the law is a
crime . . . no matter who the perpetrator is or what the circumstances
are.”192 It emphasized that nothing should prevent the investigation into the
alleged abuses because noninvestigation would make a “mockery of the law
and the natural rights of civilians.”193 The court urged police to become
“serious, proactive, and alert” in taking the necessary steps for proper
investigation, as they had continuously shown indifference to fulfilling their
duty to investigate.194
As a practical matter, however, investigations into complaints have often
been stalled or conducted haphazardly. In the case of Yasoda Sharma v.
Nepal,195 the enforced disappearance of Surya Prasad Sharma has not been
investigated despite holdings from the HRC that Nepal has an obligation to
conduct thorough investigations into alleged violations and to prosecute
those held responsible.196 Similarly, the police have delayed their
investigation into the alleged murder of Arjun Lama and the possible
involvement of Minister Agni Sapkota’s in the murder.197
This failure to adequately investigate affects Nepal’s ability to bring
criminal prosecutions against those responsible for human rights violations.
Article 135(2) of Nepal’s Interim Constitution gives public prosecutors the
final say about whether to initiate a prosecution through court proceedings
based on the information gathered from investigations.198 Additionally,
section 6 of the State Cases Act states that public prosecutors “shall give
necessary direction to the investigating police officer” to ensure that
thorough investigations into filed complaints are taking place.199 It often

191. Advocacy Forum & Human Rights Watch, Indifference to Duty: Impunity for
Crimes Committed in Nepal, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 7 (2010), http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/nepal1210webwcover.pdf.
192. Id. at 6.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 7.
195. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comment No. 1469/2006, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/94/D/1469/2006 (2008).
196. Id.
197. Sushil Pyakurel v. Prime Minister Jhalanath Khanal, WN 1094 2068 (2011), 2–3
(Nepal) (translation provided by Advocacy Forum) (expressing the Court’s disapproval at
the unreasonable delay in investigation by the police and stating that Sapkota had a moral
and legal responsibility to cooperate with the police investigation).
198. NEPAL INTERIM CONST. art. 135.
199. Waiting for Justice, supra note 16, at 34 (citing State Cases Act 2049, § 6 (1991)
(Nepal)).
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happens that, after investigations are completed, public prosecutors will
decide not to proceed with a prosecution due to a lack of evidence.200
One concern raised among human rights actors has been the existence of
situations where the structure of prosecutorial powers has allowed public
prosecutors to collude with police officers to ensure certain cases did not
proceed. In the case of Sahid Ullah Dewan, the local police initially refused
to register the complaint, instead claiming that the victim was killed in
crossfire and was not murdered.201 The appellate court issued a writ of
mandamus, ordering the police to file the report and start investigations into
the situation.202 However, the district Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO)
failed to file the court proceedings.203 When the court decision was
communicated to the PPO at the appellate court, the appellate PPO directed
the district PPO to file the court proceedings and aid the investigation.204
Instead, the district PPO continued to seek approval of the decision not to
initiate investigations.205 Examples like this one, of slow and often
nonexistent criminal proceedings against perpetrators of human rights
abuses, remain part of Nepal’s transitional justice landscape.
2. Amnesties, Pardons, and Withdrawals
Another method that Nepal has implemented in its transitional justice
pursuits is that of amnesties, pardons, and withdrawals. Amnesties are legal
measures having the effect of “(a) [p]rospectively barring criminal
prosecution and, in some cases, civil actions against certain individuals or
categories of individuals in respect of specified criminal conduct committed
before the amnesty’s adoption; or (b) [r]etroactively nullifying legal
liability previously established.”206 Although the method of implementing
amnesties has varied from state to state, they have been widely used by
states during transitional periods.207 Similarly, pardons are official
200. For example, in Annual Report 2066/67 of the Attorney General, it was stated that
public prosecutors had declined to initiate prosecutions in 1,795 out of 9,682 cases because
they believed there was a lack of evidence. Evading Accountability by Hook or by Crook:
The Issue of Amnesties in Post-conflict Nepal, ADVOCACY FORUM, 9 (June 2011),
http://www.advocacyforum.org/downloads/pdf/publications/evading-accountability-byhook-or-by-crook.pdf.
201. See Advocacy Forum & Human Rights Watch, Adding Insult to Injury: Continued
Impunity for Wartime Abuses, PEACE BRIGADES INT’L, 23 (Dec. 2011), http://
www.peacebrigades.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/publikationen_pbi_internatioal/ad
ding-insult-to-injury-nov-30-2011-english-version.pdf.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 23–24.
206. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Postconflict States: Amnesties, 5, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/09/1 (2009) [hereinafter Rule-of-Law
Tools: Amnesties].
207. See Peerenboom, supra note 38, at 916 (noting that virtually every transition in the
last several decades has involved some form of amnesty); see also Ronald C. Slye, The
Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles of AngloAmerican Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 174 (2002).
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government acts that exempt an already convicted criminal or criminals
from serving the prescribed sentence, in whole or in part.208
For some regimes, amnesties are seen as a necessary step in stopping a
conflict or in securing and maintaining a transition toward a democratic
government.209 Amnesties may be considered the price that must be paid to
rid the country of conflict and war.210 During the armed conflict in Nepal,
it was common for the government to induce Maoists to surrender by
offering to withdraw any charges pending against them.211 In addition, in
July 1998 the government of Nepal announced a general amnesty for
members of the Maoist party who surrendered and agreed to give up
arms.212
Nepal also allows for pardons through Article 151 of its Interim
Constitution, which allows the government to “grant pardons [to persons
convicted], and to suspend, commute or remit any sentence passed by any
court, special court, military court or by any other judicial or quasi-judicial,
or administrative authority or institution.”213 In the case of Mukeshwor Das
Kathwania against Constituent Assembly member Bal Krishna Dhungel,
Maoists used Article 151 to attempt to secure a formal pardon for Dhungel
after he had been tried and sentenced to life.214 The Supreme Court of
Nepal held in an interim order that pardons should only be allowed in the
“rarest of rare cases” and should never be exercised as common practice.215
Despite the court upholding the conviction, Dhungel continues to be an
active member of the Constituent Assembly and has yet to be arrested.216
Media reports also show that a senior Home Ministry official was
transferred after he refused to process the necessary paperwork to initiate a
pardon for Dhungel.217
An additional and related mechanism operating in Nepal is the
withdrawal of cases against individuals. In Nepal, the procedure for
withdrawing cases is governed by section 29 of the State Cases Act, which
states that cases of a political nature can be withdrawn on the basis of (a) a
deed of reconciliation between the parties involved; or (b) a court agreeing
to the government proposal.218 The 1998 Procedures and Norms to be
Adopted While Withdrawing Government Cases states that this category of
208. Rule-of-Law Tools: Amnesties, supra note 206, at 5.
209. Robinson, supra note 140, at 495.
210. Id.
211. See ADVOCACY FORUM, supra note 200, at 2.
212. Id. at 2 n.10.
213. NEPAL INTERIM CONST. art. 151.
214. See Advocacy Forum & Human Rights Watch, supra note 201, at 26.
215. ADVOCACY FORUM, supra note 200, at 8.
216. See Plea to Ban Dhungel from Entering CA Hall, KATHMANDU POST (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/11/04/nation/plea-to-ban-dhungelfrom-entering-ca-hall/214532/.
217. Anil Giri, Impunity watch: Cases Against Maoists Being Fast Withdrawn,
KATHMANDU POST (May 18, 2011), http://www.ekantipur.com/2011/05/18/top-story/
impunity-watch-cases-against-maoists-being-fast-withdrawn/334165.html.
218. See ADVOCACY FORUM, supra note 200, at 15.

966

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

offenses “shall only be withdrawn in the rarest of instances.”219 Yet, case
withdrawal has been one of the chief methods of evading accountability for
crimes committed during the conflict.220 A substantial number of cases
filed in the district courts across Nepal have been withdrawn by executive
order in an effort to further the peace process.221
In Nepal v. Gagan Raya Yadav, involving case withdrawals, the Supreme
Court of Nepal articulated that case withdrawals were not permissible.222
The court held that an inherent understanding behind the case withdrawal
provision was that it would be used with good intention and does not stand
as an absolute right.223 In 2011, the court reversed its position and
broadened the standard for what could be considered a political crime by
holding that a crime committed during the conflict period is prima facie
political in nature, and thus was appropriate for case withdrawal.224
3. Establishment of a Truth Commission
The Comprehensive Peace Accord signed in 2006 obliged the
government to set up the TRC to investigate the truth about those who have
seriously violated human rights.225 The Interim Constitution further affirms
the establishment of a high-level TRC charged to “investigate the facts” in
order to “create an atmosphere of reconciliation.”226 In addition, the
Interim Constitution provides for an investigation commission to be set for
investigating disappearances that occurred during the ten-year conflict.227
The draft bills of the transitional justice mechanisms indicate that both
the TRC and the Commission on Disappearances are given broad powers to
investigate and establish the truth behind the conflict and disappearances.228
Yet, neither draft bill provides the commissions with prosecutorial powers,
nor is there any indication that these transitional justice mechanisms

219. Id. at 3.
220. See Advocacy Forum & Human Rights Watch, supra note 201, at 25 (“Successive
governments have so far withdrawn more than 600 wartime criminal cases (including murder
and rape), citing authority from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), section 29 of
the State Cases Act, 1992, and the August 1998, Procedures and Norms to be Adopted While
Withdrawing Government Cases.”).
221. See ADVOCACY FORUM, supra note 200, at 5 (discussing Chief Secretary Bhojraj
Bhimire’s authorization of a blanket withdrawal of 349 cases by the Maoist-led government
in 2008 and noting the step as an action to “steer the peace process forward and to
implement the clause 5.2.7 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement”).
222. BINOD BHATTARAI, IMPUNITY IN NEPAL 90–92 (2010).
223. Id. at 92 (noting that “it would not be fitting . . . to allow withdrawal of any type of
case to be withdrawn anytime”).
224. See Chapagain, supra note 183, at 30.
225. See CPA, supra note 25, ¶ 5.2.5.
226. NEPAL INTERIM CONST. art. 33(s).
227. Id. art. 33(q).
228. Truth and Reconciliation Act 2066, art. 15 (2009) (Nepal) (Draft Bill) (translation
provided by Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice); Act of Disappearing a Person (Crime and
Punishment) Act 2066, art. 16 (2009) (Nepal) (Draft Bill) (translation provided by Int’l Ctr.
for Transitional Justice).
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override the already established criminal justice mechanisms.229 Rather,
they provide that each commission should submit to Nepal’s Attorney
General the necessary information for criminal prosecutions.230
Despite multiple drafts of the Commission’s bills, neither the TRC nor
the Commission on Disappearances has been formed in Nepal. Nepal’s
Supreme Court has publicly stated that the failure to form a truth and
reconciliation commission given the obligation of the State to do so under
Article 33(n) of the Interim Constitution and section 5.2.5 of the CPA is a
“sad aspect.”231
III. NEPAL’S (IN)ACTIONS IN FULFILLING ITS OBLIGATION
TO ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY
One of the central questions of this Note is how a transitioning state
should address allegations of human rights abuses submitted against public
officials in positions of influence and power. The transitional justice
context poses unique challenges—a transitioning state not only has to deal
with a record of past human rights violations, but is also looking forward
and attempting to secure peace, enhance democracy, and develop.232
Transitioning states must also address many unique problems including,
among other things, the people’s wariness of political regimes, a lack of
political will, and an overwhelming number of problems to address and
solve.233 Despite these difficulties, the transitional justice context does not
change the legal obligations of a state.234
Part III of this Note examines how Nepal’s actions in response to the
abuses committed during its civil war have been inadequate, especially in
light of the transitional justice mechanisms employed by other countries in
post-conflict situations. Part III begins by looking at Nepal’s reliance on
the use of amnesties and then turns to look at its reliance on the pending
creation of a truth commission. Ultimately, the two together have led to
years of virtual inaction by the Nepali government, which flies in the face
of its international human rights obligations.
A. Nepal’s Reliance on Amnesties As a Violation of International Law
There is a growing consensus in international law that sweeping
amnesties for serious violations of human rights are illegal, regardless of

229. See generally Truth and Reconciliation Act 2066; Act of Disappearing a Person
(Crime and Punishment) Act 2066.
230. Truth and Reconciliation Act 2066, art. 24; Act of Disappearing a Person (Crime and
Punishment) Act 2066, art. 25.
231. See Sushil Pyakurel v. Prime Minister Jhalanath Khanal, WN 1094 2068 (2011), 4
(Nepal) (translation provided by Advocacy Forum).
232. See supra Part I.B.1.
233. See supra Part I.B.2.
234. See generally supra Part I.C.

968

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

whether they are given in exchange for a confession or apology.235 This is
especially true for amnesties that “prevent prosecution of individuals who
may be criminally responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against
humanity, gross violations of human rights, or serious violations of
international humanitarian law.”236
Amnesties violate victims’ fundamental rights under international law.237
It has been well established that victims have a fundamental right to an
effective remedy, which imposes a duty on states to thoroughly investigate
and prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuses.238 Amnesties, by their
very nature, deny victims the right to have the perpetrators of abuse brought
to justice.
Additionally, amnesties have been shown to impede the desired objective
of peace in post-conflict societies.239 Peace conditioned on impunity for
serious crimes in violation of human rights is not sustainable.240 In Sierra
Leone, for example, the existence of three blanket amnesty provisions
hindered the peace process and indeed failed to solidify peace during the
eleven-year civil war.241 Under the belief that amnesty was necessary for a
ceasefire, a provision providing amnesty to all combatants who had
committed human rights abuses during the conflict was included in the
1999 Lome Peace Accord.242 Rather than secure peace, the amnesty
provisions created an expectation that later agreements would contain
similar provisions, thus further emboldening human rights abusers.243
What followed after each peace agreement was an increase in violations of
235. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 134 (“There is a growing consensus in international law
that, at least for the most heinous violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law, a sweeping amnesty is impermissible.”); see also Slye, supra note 207, at 175 (“[A]
consensus has emerged in the last fifty years that certain acts by official actors are no longer
beyond the reach of legal accountability.”).
236. Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 86, ¶ 52; see also E.S.C. Res. 1989/65,
supra note 78, ¶ 19 (“In no circumstances, including a state of war, siege or other public
emergency, shall blanket immunity from prosecution be granted to any person allegedly
involved in extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions.”).
237. See Kritz, supra note 33, at 129 (describing total impunity in the form of amnesties
as “immoral, injurious to victims, and in violation of international legal norms”).
238. See supra Part I.C.3.
239. See Nanda, supra note 114, at 389 (“[A]s a matter of policy, there must be
accountability and no political tradeoffs which result in the sacrifice of justice at the altar of
perceived but illusory peace, for the dichotomy is false, as justice is a prerequisite for
obtaining a peace that is to endure.”); Robinson, supra note 140, at 496 (“[R]ecent
experience has tended to contradict the supposedly ‘pragmatic’ view that prosecution is
destabilizing and that amnesties are necessary for peace, as indeed the very opposite
propositions have been recently borne out.”).
240. Kritz, supra note 33, at 128 (“Legal or political protection from prosecution
following the commission of mass crimes only gives confidence to those who would
contemplate perpetrating them.”).
241. See Robinson, supra note 140, at 496.
242. Peace Agreement, Sierra Leone-Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, art. 9,
July 7, 1999, available at http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_
agreements/sierra_leone_07071999.pdf; see also Robinson, supra note 140, at 496.
243. Robinson, supra note 140, at 496 (“[I]nstead this merely reinforced a culture of
impunity in which brutal acts of mutilation and lawlessness continued.”).
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human rights and the progressively numerous and severe instances of rape,
torture, and summary executions instead of the peace that was hoped for.244
After the rise in atrocities, the policy was reversed in favor of the
prosecution and punishment of those involved in international crimes.245
This policy was solidified in the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra
Leone, which stated that prior amnesty provisions would not bar the
prosecution of those implicated in human rights abuses.246
As in the case of Sierra Leone, justice may require setting aside
previously agreed upon amnesty laws entered into as a condition for ending
conflict.247 This may very well be the case in Nepal, where numerous
members of Nepal’s Army and individuals within the Maoist ranks who
were responsible for abuses during the conflict period continue to evade
accountability, thus pointing toward limited political commitment to serious
accountability processes that would challenge the current culture of
impunity.248 Without a threat of action against human rights abusers, Nepal
will be unable to sufficiently transition into a state premised on the rule of
law.
B. Nepal’s Reliance on Truth Commissions As a Violation of
Domestic and International Law
One of the primary arguments put forward by authorities in Nepal against
prosecutions of human rights violators is that the crimes committed during
the conflict should be addressed by transitional justice mechanisms,
including the proposed TRC and Commission on Disappearances, neither of
which has been formed.249 The transitional justice mechanisms of truth
commissions in their varied forms have an important role in assisting a
country to move from a conflict-ridden society to a more democratic
society.250 However, the assertion that crimes committed during the

244. Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, 57–61 (July 2009), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0709webwcover
_1.pdf.
245. U.N. Secretary-General, The Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone:
Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000), available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/DOCUMENTS/tabid/176/Default.aspx.
246. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1315, art. 10, U.N. Doc.
S/2002/246, app. II Attachment (Jan. 16, 2002) (stating that any amnesties that were granted
“shall not be a bar to prosecution”).
247. Peerenboom, supra note 38, at 914 (“Holding former leaders accountable may
require setting aside laws that legitimated their actions and ignoring amnesty agreements
entered into as a condition for relinquishing power.”).
248. See Farasat & Hayner, supra note 9, at 15 (noting how “discussions of accountability
were supplanted by lengthy negotiations on political issues” and that there was a tacit
agreement among parties that conflict-related human rights abuses would be granted blanket
amnesty).
249. See, e.g., Advocacy Forum & Human Rights Watch, supra note 201, at 12 (showing
defendant arguing that his case fell under the jurisdiction of the TRC, thus precluding the
application of existing laws).
250. See supra Part I.D.3.
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conflict can or should be addressed solely by such mechanisms has no basis
in Nepali or international law.
Nepal’s national legal and policy framework support the contention that
criminal justice mechanisms must be pursued independent of the efforts of
both the TRC and Commission on Disappearances. Even within the
language contained in the CPA and Interim Constitution obliging the Nepali
government to set up the TRC, there is no mention of the TRC having
exclusive powers to deal with international crimes and serious violations of
human rights.251 Nor does the language suggest that regular judicial
mechanisms be suppressed.252 Rather, when read in conjunction with
Clause 7.1.3 of the CPA, which affirms the commitment of the parties to
ensuring that impunity is combated and the rights of victim are protected, it
is clear that the criminal justice system is meant to function in parallel with
the establishment of the TRC.253 Additionally, Article 100 of the Interim
Constitution reaffirms that the “[p]owers relating to justice in Nepal shall be
exercised by courts and other judicial institutions in accordance with the
provisions of this Constitution, the laws and the recognized principles of
justice.”254 Nepal’s Supreme Court jurisprudence further indicates that the
transitional justice system does not supersede criminal justice mechanisms.
Rather, the court has held that the regular justice system gains increasing
momentum and importance in situations where the transitional justice
system has not yet been established.255 The court stressed that the “law and
justice system is never inactive in a democratic country; law is never
vacant.”256
One of the greatest advantages of a truth commission is that it can begin
its functions relatively quickly, as compared to the processes within the
criminal justice system.257 But, a delay in a commission’s tasks will
quickly deplete this benefit and instead lead to a loss of confidence and
interests in the commission’s potential to bring accountability and
change.258 In light of the State’s inability to create either the TRC or the
Disappearances Commission, the Supreme Court of Nepal in June 2007
issued a decision on a case involving enforced disappearances that stressed
the urgency of investigating and prosecuting such offenses, as required by

251. See supra notes 225–30 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 225–30 and accompanying text.
253. See Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 86, ¶ 5.
254. NEPAL INTERIM CONST. art. 100.
255. Sushil Pyakurel v. Prime Minister Jhalanath Khanal, WN 1094 2068 (2011), at 4–5
(Nepal) (translation provided by Advocacy Forum).
256. Id. at 4.
257. Kritz, supra note 33, at 141–42 (describing how truth commissions can be organized
and start functioning quickly, thus standing as a way to “buy time” and relieve immediate
pressure to take action against those who committed human rights abuses while the criminal
justice gets organized).
258. See Bohl, supra note 142, at 573 (“[A]voiding delays does compromise the resulting
quality of justice.”); Kritz, supra note 33, at 142 (describing how in Uganda the
Commission’s effectiveness was reduced in inverse relation to its longevity).

2012]

A CALL TO ACTION

971

constitutional and international law.259
It stated that “the legal
investigation, prosecution and remedies to be implemented with respect to a
remedial mechanism involving fundamental rights cannot be a matter of
secondary priority and in addition, are not outside the jurisdiction of this
Court.”260 Thus, the rights of victims to an effective remedy must be
protected through effective mechanisms.
C. Inaction is Not Action
Combating impunity in a post-conflict society hoping to emerge from its
past by establishing the rule of law can only be done by holding
perpetrators accountable and thereby showing that consequences will
swiftly follow those who choose to commit human rights violations.261
Through the use of administrative sanctions or criminal prosecutions, the
new government will be able to show its commitment to combat impunity,
which will not only deter future crimes from being committed but also
promote public confidence in the new regimes. Accountability processes
are an essential component of longer term peace building and failure to
pursue civil or criminal actions against perpetrators of human rights only
serves to undermine the legitimacy of new governments.262
Justice will inevitably be imperfect in the transitional context.263 Despite
the problems associated with the pursuit of justice, newly democratic states
must continue the pursuit in order to establish a society reflecting a firmly
established rule of law.264 The multitude of challenges faced in postconflict environments necessitates an approach that balances various goals,
including the pursuit of accountability, the need for truth, the preservation
of peace, and the building of democracy.265 Successful transitional justice
programs will likely necessitate the use of various mechanisms to meet all
the goals of transitional justice.
The use of various mechanisms in conjunction with one another ensures
that all gaps in the justice spectrum are filled. A comprehensive program
will ensure that every victim will receive some justice and ensure that all of
259. Rajendra Dhakal v. Government of Nepal Ministry of Home Affairs, NKP 3575
(2007), 25 (Nepal) (translation provided by Advocacy Forum) (“The State has the
responsibility to address the incidents and realities of the degrading situation of human rights
and violation of humanitarian law during the time of conflict in a serious and responsible
manner for the purpose of promoting the peaceful transformation of the conflict.”).
260. Id.
261. Marco Fanara, Prosecution or Impunity? Is there an Alternative?, PEACE &
CONFLICT MONITOR (May 13, 2011), http://www.monitor.upeace.org/printer.cfm?id_article=
799.
262. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 2.
263. See Kritz, supra note 53, at 30–32 (commenting that “imperfect justice” in
transitional contexts is nearly inevitable because such transitional criminal justice systems
tend to be dysfunctional).
264. See Kamali, supra note 30, at 92 (arguing that even if the mechanisms employed by
a state in its pursuit of justice are employed imperfectly, they are necessary in sustaining the
new democratic order).
265. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28, ¶ 25.
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society will benefit. For example, criminal prosecutions through court
systems can help to determine individual culpability and to punish
individuals accordingly.266 Meanwhile, a vetting process can aim at
reforming institutions through linking the past conduct of individuals to
institutions.267 And finally, a truth commission provides an accounting of
the social dynamics behind the conflict and builds a collective memory of
the nation’s conflict.268 With the different types of information and
different methods of action, a holistic approach toward justice can be
implemented and can help pave the way for a holistic peace.
Nepal’s current approach of inaction is not only unsound as a legal
matter but is also unlikely to sustain peace and democracy. Impunity is the
current standard of reality in Nepal. The legacy of enduring impunity for
past crimes could have long-lasting negative repercussions on Nepal’s
ability to develop and maintain the rule of law. As Jyoti Sanghera, the chief
of HRC for Nepal, said, “Lack of accountability in cases of alleged human
rights violations not only sends a message that there are no consequences
for the perpetrators of such violations, but further adds to the suffering of
the victims and their families who have been awaiting justice for many
years.”269
CONCLUSION
Nepal is at a tipping point—its decisions during this transition period will
set a tone for its development as a country and the possibility of a peaceful,
democratic future. There are a wide range of transitional justice
mechanisms within Nepal’s reach. Regardless of the combination of
mechanisms that Nepal chooses to implement, one lesson that cannot be
ignored is that inaction during such a critical period will only prove
detrimental. Nepal must act. Creating a “new Nepal” will require much
more than political statements and formal agreements; it will require serious
political commitment to the principle of the rule of law and challenging the
culture of impunity.

266. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
269. Nepal: UN Rights Office Deplores Appointment of Man Suspected of Serious Crime,
UN NEWS CENTRE (May 5, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
38284&Cr=nepal&Cr1#.UE6EsLJmQWk.

